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by
John William Clack
B.S., Public Policy, Olivet Nazarene University, 2007
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ABSTRACT
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) budget doubling from 1998 through 2003
stimulated demand for biomedical scientists, increasing both relative wages and
employment. However, because research doctorates in these fields may take six years or
more to complete, there is a substantial lag in the labor supply response to changing
market conditions. Rational expectations models assume that prospective graduate
students can forecast their expected future wages, taking into account other students’
likely responses and thus also future employment levels. However, prior research on
student enrollment and degree completion in science and engineering fields suggests that
market conditions at the time of enrollment are taken as proxies for future conditions.
Previous studies also suggest that graduate student enrollment and PhD completions may
be responsive to changes in availability and mechanism of financial support. This thesis
uses instrumental variables estimation on time-series data including biomedical
scientists’ wages and employment, bachelor’s degrees and PhD completions, and NIH
and private industry research funding, to examine responsiveness of labor supply to
changing market conditions, and particularly to changes in NIH funding levels. We find
that graduate student enrollment and PhD completions are highly responsive to NIH
v

financial support, to current trends in job availability at time of enrollment, and to
expected earnings.

Table of Contents
I. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
I.A.
II.

Summary of Findings ............................................................................ 7

Empirical approach ....................................................................................... 7

II.A.

Data ........................................................................................................ 8

Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Statistics ................... 8
NSF Survey of Doctoral Recipients (SDR) .................................................. 10
American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Sample ..................... 11
NSF-NIH Survey of Graduate Students and Postdoctorates in Science and
Engineering ............................................................................................................... 11
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) Completions ... 12
Survey of Earned Doctorates ........................................................................ 13
Macroeconomic Data Series ......................................................................... 14
II.B.

Models ................................................................................................. 17
vi

Modeling Demand for Biomedical Scientists ............................................... 23
II.C.

Econometric Estimation ...................................................................... 24

Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation ........................................................ 25
III.

Results ......................................................................................................... 27
Models of the Supply of Biomedical Scientists ............................................ 28
Models of the Demand for Biomedical Scientists ........................................ 37

IV.

Conclusions ................................................................................................. 40

IV.A.

Policy Implications .............................................................................. 40

IV.B.

Limitations ........................................................................................... 41

IV.C.

Summary and Directions for Future Research .................................... 42

vii

I.

INTRODUCTION
The number of science and engineering (S&E) PhDs awarded annually in the

United States has been rising consistently from the 1960s to the present. Life sciences
specifically have grown to see more than 11 thousand degrees granted in 2010, from
fewer than three thousand graduates in 1966.
From 1998 through 2003, Congress effectively doubled the total combined budget
for the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH), from $18.3 billion to $36.4 billion in
constant 2010 dollars. The resulting increase in demand for biomedical scientists was
largely reflected in dramatically increased demand for postdoctoral researchers;
temporary appointments that have become a near-ubiquitous career waypoint for freshly
minted PhDs. This is in contrast to the academic market of the 1970s (Stephan, 2012).
The rapid growth in demand for postdocs was almost entirely met by an influx of
international PhDs moving to the United States specifically to fill the need (Garrison,
2005). However, the increase in demand for labor apparently had no effect on more
permanent, tenured and tenure-track faculty positions (Blume-Kohout, 2012).
Economists are coming to believe that the life science labor market may be
saturated – providing a career path where scientists forfeit significant earnings for
tenuous career prospects (Stephan, 2012). Given that trainees have become a primary
engine of research in the lab-focused biomedical education system, universities may be
motivated to overproduce scientists. Biomedical students graduating in the late seventies
1

had an approximate 30% chance of receiving a tenure-track position by 1985. This
dropped to 20% for students graduating in the late eighties and surveyed in 1995
(Committee on Dimensions, 1998). Where increased biomedical science investment was
expected to create long-term job opportunities within these fields, it may not be doing so.
For the group of elite 1992-1994 National Research Service Award (NRSA) winners it
yielded little career assistance (Levitt, 2010). As of 2010, more than a decade after their
graduations, only approximately 25% of those students had achieved tenure at a
university. That trend has continued and the biomedical labor market still struggles to
absorb fully-trained biomedical scientists into full-time and tenure-track faculty research
positions (Stephan, 2012).
The changing life science labor market may alter job prospects at every level.
While established end-career prospects may motivate students to matriculate, funding
opportunities also determine enrollment. Garrison et. al. (2005) found that the number of
research assistants funded by the NIH held steady from 1995 through 2000 - the
beginning of the NIH budget doubling. In contrast, we found that the number of RAs
was already increasing in that time period.
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Figure 1: Students funded by NIH – Data from NIH Data Book, 2012 and NCSES

The appearance of declining employment rates in the biomedical sciences elicits
concerns over institutional stewardship of the future biomedical workforce. Do
universities care about the ultimate placement of their graduates? Do funding institutions
realize that the current system may be preparing the majority of graduate students, given
that most are hoping for a tenured career in academia, for undesired career outcomes?
The NIH Advisory Committee to the Director (ACD) Biomedical Research Workforce
Working Group recently issued a report addressing the NIH’s understanding of these
issues. NIH administration seems to recognize the current state of the life science labor
market and the task force ultimately recommends limits on the number of funding years
3

available to each student and a move from RA grants to training grants: the better to
guide and homogenize training quality across institutions (Tilghman, 2012). At the
institutional level it may be more difficult to coordinate enrollment based on the job
market. Institutions are given to supplementing or withdrawing graduate student funding
counter-cyclically to the National Institutes of Health (Ehrenberg, 1993).
Present concerns about the over-production and the quality of biomedical
scientists come on the heels of a pervasive historical fears that the United States is underproducing in the sciences. Rising Above the Gathering Storm, a report from the National
Research Council, paints a global landscape in which the United States is falling behind
other nations in scientific education, research, and productivity (2005). Should we fail to
remain competitive, the report argues, the United States will de-facto sacrifice economic
and political status to other nations.
This paper extends research which has previously primarily focused on
undergraduates, into the market for PhD-trained workers. Whether graduate students, and
specifically those in life sciences, choose graduate training in response to current or
future expected future labor market conditions has yet to be firmly established. Degrees
in biomedical science appear so specialized, and require such a sacrifice of early career
earnings, that it begs the question whether students who have chosen to study in these
fields are doing so out of a natural affinity for the subject or the non-pecuniary benefit,
rather than simply a desire to maximize their lifetime earnings. Other graduate degrees,
such as the MBA, require a shorter time investment in education to produce greater
4

expected lifetime earnings. Furthermore, since pursuit of a PhD is a long-term career
investment, often in excess of five years, market conditions at graduation may be vastly
different from market conditions at the time of enrollment. In an ideal labor market,
students considering a graduate degree would make informed decisions based on their
best understanding of their future career prospects including inherent non-pecuniary
benefits.
While changes in graduate and undergraduate enrollment are broadly a function
of population growth, there are important policy questions to be addressed in short-term
enrollment trends. It is generally accepted that the university has acted within the labor
market as a refuge from down economies for undergraduates. A workforce facing high
unemployment rates or low wages will return to the university (Betts and McFarland,
1995). While we are measuring the macroeconomic determinants of graduate biomedical
matriculation, we also take into account other influences, such as the availability of
funding. Previous research has found that interest rates affect the attractiveness of school
to potential students (Dellas and Koubi, 2003) and the sources of funding available to a
student affect his or her ability to complete a degree (Ampaw, 2010). Cohort size has also
proven to be important. An influx of foreign students into a given field will result in
lower wages and employment rates within that field (Borjas, 2006). Students,
undergraduates especially, have proven themselves to be vulnerable to business cycles
and to be rational actors in the labor market (Dellas and Sakellaris, 2003). When the
opportunity-cost of education is low, that is when unemployment rates are high or wages
5

are low, people choose to pursue education in higher numbers. Student demographics
also have some effect on matriculation. Male students with high undergraduate GPAs are
more responsive to business cycles than are students with low GPAs and females (Bedard
and Herman, 2008).
This thesis analyzes recent trends in the market for biomedical science PhDs and
evaluates the extent to which graduate student enrollments reflect rational foresight
regarding future market conditions. To a first approximation, one might expect current,
short-run demand shifts for biomedical scientists to affect current new PhD enrollments,
as such shifts may affect students’ perceptions of longer-run career prospects. On the
other hand, the particular policy shift examined here—the NIH budget doubling—was
announced in advance, so rational agents might have anticipated that early trends in
wages and job growth would not persist.
Using time-series data from a variety of nationally representative surveys
including counts of first-time graduate student enrollments, PhD completions, estimates
of biomedical scientists’ and alternative occupations’ salaries and employment rates, and
both NIH and biopharmaceutical industry R&D expenditures over the period 1998
through 2010, we evaluate the relative importance of various incentives which draw
students towards a career in biomedical sciences. In particular, we assess how changes in
NIH R&D expenditures influence both demand and supply in the market for biomedical
sciences workforce. We find that the increase in demand during the budget doubling
period, reflected both in higher relative wages and in job growth for biomedical sciences
6

occupations, appears to have lured students to enroll in graduate programs. However,
students who entered in 1998 were graduating just as the expansion came to an end, and
since 2006 the number of PhDs produced each year by U.S. biomedical sciences
programs has generally exceeded the growth in U.S. jobs.
Empirically, Ryoo and Rosen (2004) found fluctuations in demand for
professional engineers were substantially driven by changes in R&D and defense-related
public expenditures. Along those lines, in this paper we evaluate responsiveness of
demand for biomedical scientists to changes in NIH appropriations and industrial
biopharma R&D.
I.A. Summary of Findings
We find that graduate student enrollment and PhD completions are responsive to
expected earnings and to employment rates in biomedical fields. Enrollment and
completions are especially responsive to NIH funding levels. Because NIH R&D is
influential on the supply side and the demand side, it lacked the exogeneity necessary to
identify market effects.

II.

EMPIRICAL APPROACH
In the analysis that follows, we combine data from various government data

sources on wages, employment, and education. Due to data limitations and strong
evidence of a structural break after the NIH budget doubling concluded, our time series
here is limited to 12 years, with some models using fewer observations due to inclusion
7

of lagged variables. Nonetheless, our results are consistent with expectations from
previous literature, and demonstrate a valid solution to the unique empirical challenge
posed. The approach demonstrated thus should be useful to future analyses, when more
data become available. Our estimations employ first-differenced OLS models in order to
mitigate autocorrelation, and instrumental variables estimation to avoid simultaneity bias.
II.A. Data
Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Statistics
Average salary estimates and employment statistics for biomedical scientists and
alternative career fields were calculated for years 1999 through 2010 using data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics, an agency within the U.S. Department of Labor, collects
OES data semiannually from 200,000 business establishments. Wage estimates in the
OES are produced by combining current-period survey data with that collected from the
previous two surveys. That is, estimates reported for May 2012 would be calculated using
data from the May 2012, November 2011, and May 2011 surveys. Due to occupation
code reclassifications after 1998, this dataset is our limiting series. All wage estimates are
inflated to constant 2010 dollars using the chained consumer price index.
To generate the biomedical scientist average wage time-series, we followed the
occupation classification from the recent NIH Advisory Committee to the Director
(ACD) task force report. These occupations are detailed in Table 1. The average wage for
each year is a weighted average, where the weights are determined by the number of
8

people in that occupation code, relative to the total sum of employees across all
biomedical sciences occupations.
In Figure 2 we see that biomedical salaries began to grow more quickly just as the
NIH budget doubling came to an end. There was also a spike in biomedical science
compensation around 2001, in the middle of the NIH program of expansion.

Figure 2: Biomedical Salary and NIH Obligations
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Table 1. Biomedical Scientist Occupation Codes for BLS OES Data
Occupation Code
11-9121
17-2031
19-1021
19-1022
19-1023
19-1041
19-1042
19-4021
25-1042

Occupation Title
Natural Sciences Managers
Biomedical Engineers
Biochemists and Biophysicists
Microbiologists
Zoologists and Wildlife Biologists
Epidemiologists
Medical Scientists, except Epidemiologists
Biological Technicians
Postsecondary Biological Sciences Teachers

The first wage series is the weighted average salary for individuals holding
bachelor’s degrees in biological sciences or chemistry, who have not earned (and are not
currently earning) a graduate degree. We constructed this series by combining data from
the National Science Foundation’s Survey of Doctoral Recipients, and the American
Community Survey, as described below.
NSF Survey of Doctoral Recipients (SDR)
The Survey of Doctoral Recipients (SDR) is a longitudinal survey of individuals
who have received a doctorate degree in science, engineering, or health fields from a U.S.
institution. Collected by the National Science Foundation every two to three years, it
follows a sample of individuals from the time they receive their PhD in a science,
engineering, or health-related field, until they reach age 75.
First, we used publicly-available SDR data to determine which bachelor’s degree
fields are associated with earning PhDs in life sciences fields. For surveys conducted in
1999 through 2008, we find more than 80% of life sciences PhDs earned bachelor’s
10

degrees in biological sciences or chemistry. Health-related majors such as nursing were
also represented among the PhDs, but those majors less frequently chose to pursue
research PhDs. As such, we felt the biological sciences and chemistry majors’ alternative
careers would be most representative of the alternatives a prospective PhD student might
consider.
American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Sample
We use the 2009 American Community Survey (ACS) Public Use Microdata
Sample (PUMS) to identify occupations associated with bachelor’s degrees in biological
sciences and chemistry. We first calculated the survey-weighted share of all biological
sciences and chemistry Bachelor’s-degree holders in each occupation code, as well as the
share of all S&E-degree holders in each occupation code. Then, we merged these
calculated shares from ACS with BLS OES wage data by 4-digit Standard Occupational
Classification system code (SOC), and used these shares to estimate a weighted average
salary by year for bachelor’s degree holders across these alternative occupations.
NSF-NIH Survey of Graduate Students and Postdoctorates in Science and Engineering
We use the NSF-NIH Survey of Graduate Students and Postdoctorates (GSS) to
estimate the number of students entering U.S. biomedical sciences degree programs each
year. The GSS is an annual survey of departments and other degree-granting units at U.S.
academic institutions, granting degrees in S&E fields. The survey collects data on partand full-time enrollment, student demographics, and students’ sources of financial
support. For this analysis, we use counts of first-time full-time students, total students
11

enrolled, and students whose primary source of financial support is NIH funding,
including NIH-funded research assistantships, traineeships, or fellowships across
institutions offering PhDs in biological, medical, and other life sciences.
Figure 3 demonstrates how enrollments have risen throughout the NIH budget
doubling years, flattening out as the NIH expansion came to an end, and reaching a sharp
peak in 2008. Enrollments rose consistently throughout most of the 12 years in our data
set, only beginning to decline as the NIH began funding more students. This may
indicate that biomedical graduate students do indeed have cobweb expectation.

Figure 3: Enrollments and Availability of Funding

Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) Completions
Counts of the number of students graduating each year from U.S. institutions with
Bachelor’s degrees in biological sciences and chemistry-related fields, as well as in all
12

S&E fields, were obtained from the National Center for Education Statistics’ IPEDS
Completions Survey. This data is collected annually in the Spring from all higher
education institutions within the United States and Washington D.C. that participate in
federal student financial aid programs.
Survey of Earned Doctorates
The Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED) has been used to collect statistics on the
complete population of students graduating with PhDs each year, from 1957 to present.
This survey includes information on race, gender, citizenship, as well as degree
characteristics. We use the SED data to determine the number of completions in
biomedical science fields each year. Figure 4 shows a similar interaction to Figure 3
except that completions are rising consistently as NIH funding becomes scarcer. This
may demonstrate that as NIH funding dries up, students become more motivated to
complete their degrees and graduate.
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Figure 4: Graduates and Availability of Funding
Macroeconomic Data Series
In addition to the survey microdata sources noted above, we also use four macrolevel data series to evaluate possible demand shifters. NIH R&D obligations by year were
obtained from the NSF Survey of Federal Funds for R&D, adjusted to constant 2010
dollars using the Biomedical Research and Development Price Index (BRDPI).
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Figure 5: Employment and NIH Obligations
Real U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) estimates in chained 2010 dollars are
calculated using U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)1 data. In addition, we
construct two alternative estimates of annual biopharmaceutical industry expenditures.
The first is Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association (PhRMA) members’
reported expenditures on domestic R&D adjusted to constant 2010 dollars using the
BRDPI. This series includes all R&D expenditures in the US by the pharmaceutical trad
association’s members, including both US and foreign-owned firms. The second uses
BEA R&D satellite accounting data for pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturers
(NAICS code 3254), available for years 1998 through 2007, and extrapolates that series

1

Data available online at
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/general/rd/2010/xls/1998_2007_rd_data_2010RDSA.xls
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through 2010 based on annual changes in PhRMA-reported expenditures. In contrast with
the PhRMA series, the BEA data excludes foreign-owned firms, but includes all US
domestic industry-performed and industry-funded R&D.
Figure 6 shows the interaction between employment and pharmaceutical R&D
obligations, showing that employment consistently trails the pharmaceutical industry by
approximately one year.

Figure 6: Employment and Pharma R&D Obligations
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Table 2. Summary of Variables
Mean

Standard
Deviation
58300.55
4056.571
2644.293

Employment in Biomedical Fields
280568
Average Annual Biomedical Workforce Salary
74667
First-Time Full-Time Graduate Students Entering
20121.2
Biomedical Sciences PhD Programs
Full-Time Biomedical Sciene Graduate Students Supported 17270.5
2342.308
by the NIH
Gross Domestic Product (in Billions of Dollars)
13404.2
1090.24
Total NIH R&D Obligations (in Millions of Dollars)
28638.7
4274.858
Total Life Sciences Broad Field U.S. PhD Completions
8262.77
6979
Total Bio/Med/Chem Bachelor's Degrees Conferred this
171639
30958.31
Year in the U.S.
Average Annual Salary for BioChem Bachelor's Grads
53789.6
2359.66
PhRMA Member Companies R&D Expenditures (in
35016.9
4620.01
Millions of Dollars)
Pharmaceutical R&D Investment
51217.9
15734.58
All Salary, Investment, and Gross Production data are represented in constant 2010
dollars.

II.B. Models
As discussed by Freeman (1976) and others, markets for highly-skilled labor are
subject to substantial “production lag,” where labor supply is largely predetermined by
entry into training programs several years prior. We use both cobweb and forwardlooking analyses in order to determine whether students are reacting to present-day
conditions or attempting to forecast the future job market. The cobweb-type models make
the assumption that present-day, time t enrollment is determined by present-day, time t
market conditions. Participants in this labor market are committing to participation in a
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labor market for which they have no more indication of wage rates than the present wage
rate (Hoy, 2001). In contrast, forward-looking models assume that students in time t are
attempting, with some success, to predict wages and employment at the time they will be
entering the market, time t+d. Here, we begin by estimating the supply of new entrants
into biomedical sciences graduate programs, as follows:
GradEntert   1 BioSalaryt  d   2 AltSalaryt  d   GradEntert 1   1

(1)

Equation (1) asserts that the number of students entering biomedical sciences
graduate programs in a given year should be determined largely by expected salaries for
completed biomedical sciences PhDs d years hence, BioSalaryt+d, where d is the time
delay between admission and completion to reduce effects of any exogenous trend in
enrollment, we include the first lag of the dependent variable. In addition to considering
their expected future wages if they go on and complete a biomedical sciences PhD,
prospective students should also consider the opportunity cost of choosing to attend
graduate school, instead of pursuing some alternative career path accessible to those who
have earned only a Bachelor’s degree. For simplicity, in equation (1) we ignore the
opportunity cost associated with years spent in graduate school, so include only the
expected salaries for those alternative careers d years hence, AltSalaryt+d. In addition, due
to data limitations, we are not able to use average wages by experience. Where ideally
wage expectations could be represented by expected lifetime earnings, we are forced to
use annual wage data. Ryoo and Rosen (2004) assume that over a short time series the
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wage profile by age and experience will be stable. If that assumption can be borrowed
then this simplification should not affect our results.
Finally, note that in our empirical analyses, all variables are log-transformed. By
using logged variables in most of our equations, we demonstrate the percent change in
the dependent variable as a result of a percent change in independent variables. This
gives a constant elasticity formulation where independent variable coefficients will give
the elasticity of the dependent variable under the assumption that all other variables are
held constant.
If graduate students have rational expectations regarding future market conditions,
then students’ expectations at time t for BioSalaryt+d and AltSalaryt+d would, on average,
equal the true values of each variable at time t+d. However, rational prospective students
may also consider strategic labor supply responses by other prospective students and
existing PhD scientists. To assess this possibility, in equation (2) we add the stock of
biomedical scientists employed at time t+d:
GradEntert   1BioSalaryt  d  2 AltSalaryt  d  3 BioEmpt  d   GradEntert 1   2

(2)

If students have “cobweb” expectations, then their expectation for BioSalaryt+d would


simply be the current salary for biomedical scientists, BioSalaryt, and likewise their
expectation for AltSalaryt+d would be AltSalaryt. Likewise, their expectations regarding
future job growth may depend on current changes in employment levels for biomedical
scientists, BioEmp. We test these alternative assumptions about students’ expectations
empirically.
19

One difficulty with the formulations in equations (1) and (2) above, as discussed
by Ryoo & Rosen (2004), is that they do not control for exogenous year-to-year changes
in cohort size that could affect the number of students completing college, and thus
eligible to enter PhD programs (i.e., supply shifters). We therefore also consider the
following relative supply model:
GradEnter
BachDeg

t
t

 1

BioSalary

td

AltSalary

td

 2

BioEmp

td

TotEmp

td

3

(3)

In this specification, the dependent variable represents the share of students who


graduated with bachelor’s degrees in biology or chemistry in year t and went on to enter
graduate programs in biomedical science fields in the following academic year. The
explanatory variable is the relative financial prospects at graduation, in year t+d, for a
student who completes a PhD in biomedical sciences, versus the wages paid for those
majors’ alternative career paths.
If we presume that all workforce outcomes for biomedical sciences PhDs are
considered by prospective students—including non-science-related and non-research
jobs—then the correct measure for students’ expected income at graduation is the average
entry-level wage for a biomedical sciences PhD, regardless of his or her occupation, as
we calculate from the SDR data.
On the other hand, if new PhDs are taking non-research and non-science-related
jobs due to an excess labor supply that depresses entry-level wages in biomedical
sciences research occupations, then only the wages in those specific positions are
relevant. This latter specification is somewhat more attractive for our market model, as
20

these wages are the relevant prices for the demand side of the market. However, in that
case, the rational expectations labor supply model should also include a measure of the
stock of biomedical sciences researchers as well. We explore each of these specifications
empirically, below.
Again, ignoring for simplicity any additional signals a student may receive during
his or her d years of graduate training that might affect expectations of future salaries, the
number of biomedical sciences PhDs supplied to the market at time t, Gradt, is then
determined mainly by GradEntert-d:
d

Grad t   1GradEnter

td



   NIHFunded

t

4

(4)

 0

In equation (4) above, we expect the term 1 will be less than one, reflecting usual


attrition from doctoral programs. We also add additional terms to assess whether
increases in the proportion of students funded by NIH research assistantships,
traineeships, or fellowships impacts timely PhD completions. The outcome variable
Gradt shows the influx of new PhDs into the labor supply that year. Like equation (3),
this equation can also be expressed in relative terms, to avoid supply-side shift effects
like changes in cohort size.
We can interpret   as the impact of changes in the availability of NIH support
for students in each year of their PhD program on their probability of completing the PhD
within d years. A significant negative coefficient would imply that an increase in NIH
support for students during that year of a given cohort’s graduate training actually
decreases the six year completion rate for the cohort. When first-differencing the
21

variables as in the empirical analyses below, the coefficient represents the effect of
acceleration in NIH spending in any given year on the rate of PhD completion.
3
2.5
2
1.5
1

95% CI - Upper

0.5

Coefficient Estimate

0

95% CI - Lower

-0.5
-1

-1.5
1

2

3

4

5

6

Figure 7: Impacts of changes NIH graduate student support on 6-year PhD
completions in years 1 through 6 - 95% Confidence Interval
Adding relative wages both at entry and at graduation provides an alternative
estimate of the effects of wages on the number of students who ultimately are eligible to
enter the workforce. To preserve degrees of freedom given the relatively short time series
we have available, in this model we consider only the percentage of biomedical sciences
graduate students funded by NIH six years prior to graduation, as a supply-side attractor:

(5)
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In the empirical analysis, we also investigate variations on equation (5) that are
exclusively cobweb (i.e., include only salary and number of jobs at time t-d) or
exclusively forward-looking (i.e., include only salary and number of jobs at time t).
Modeling Demand for Biomedical Scientists
In recent years approximately 70 percent of new PhD biomedical scientists have
taken postdoctoral research/training positions (Stephan, 2012). Many of these
postdoctoral positions are funded by NIH extramural research and training grants, but
some are in industry (e.g., at biopharmaceutical firms) and in government. We therefore
represent the (inverse) demand function for biomedical scientists as follows:
BioSalary t
AltSalary t

 1

BioEmp t
TotEmp t

 2

NIHRnD
GDP t

t

3

PharmaRnD
GDP t

t

6

(6)

In this representation, the dependent variable is the log relative wage for

biomedical
scientists, and BioEmpt is the total number of biomedical scientists employed

at time t. The demand-shifters are total NIH obligations for R&D in year t, NIHRnDt,
representing demand for postdoctoral workers in academia and government, and
estimated annual pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry R&D expenditures,
PharmaRnDt, to represent demand in industry. As usual, we expect the sign on 1 will be
negative, reflecting that an increase in labor market supply will, all else equal, reduce
PhDs’ market wages.
Finally, we can also estimate the relative demand function directly, with quantity
demanded as the dependent variable:
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BioEmp t
TotEmp t

 1

BioSalary t
AltSalary t

2

NIHRnD

t

GDP t

3

PharmaRnD
GDP t

t

7

(7)

II.C. Econometric Estimation


If an exogenous shock to wages or employment in one period affects unobserved
factors in later periods, there may exist autocorrelation in the error terms. While there are
many ways of testing for autocorrelation, here we follow Ryoo and Rosen (2004) in using
the Durbin-Watson tests.
The Durbin-Watson test, or d statistic, uses the OLS residuals to detect first-order
autocorrelation. The d statistic is calculated as:
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ˆ
2 1  

2
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t 1

The term ˆ is the sample correlation coefficient, estimated from the residuals:




ˆ 


 uˆ uˆ 
 uˆ
t

t 1

2
t

Because the correlation coefficient is bounded between -1 and 1, where -1 is perfect


negative autocorrelation and 1 is perfect positive correlation, the d statistic will be
approximately 2 when there is no autocorrelation, will approach zero when
autocorrelation is strongly positive, and will approach 4 when autocorrelation is strongly
negative. Durbin and Watson (1951) derived a table of critical values, that is, lower and
upper bounds for an acceptable d statistic, given various combinations of number of
explanatory variables and sample size. The closer the d statistic is to 2, the greater the
probability that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.
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The original Durbin-Watson test assumes strict exogeneity of the regressors,
which precludes its use in autoregressive models like that in equation (1). In models such
as that, where lagged values of the dependent variable are included among the
explanatory variables, the d statistic will be biased towards 2 and thus we may fail to
reject the null of no autocorrelation, even when autocorrelation is present. Durbin (1970)
presented a more general alternative test that permits lagged dependent variables, and
also assesses presence of higher-order autocorrelation.
Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation
Structural market models, such as the supply and demand equations we estimate
here, are characterized by jointly (simultaneously) determined prices and quantities. If
estimated independently, without taking into account the information provided by other
equations in the system, simultaneous equations will yield inconsistent results.
Specifically, if the error term in one equation is correlated with an explanatory variable in
the other equation, simultaneous equations bias will occur.
Empirically, one approach to estimating simultaneous equations is two-stage least
squares (2SLS) IV. To implement 2SLS IV estimation for the labor supply equation, we
need to find one or more instruments that are highly correlated with biomedical
scientists’ wages, but are otherwise uncorrelated with unobserved factors affecting the
number of students enrolling in (or completing) PhD programs in biomedical sciences.
Ryoo and Rosen (2004) employ the third and fourth lags of public and private defense
R&D spending relative to total GDP, which they argue reflect changes in demand that
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only affect supply of bachelor’s-degree engineers through their prospective wages. For
us, NIH R&D as a share of total GDP would be analogous, but empirically we find that
public (NIH) R&D funding is in fact a strong predictor of supply as well as demand, and
therefore does not assist in resolving the identification problem. This relationship
between our nominal “demand shifter” NIH funding and graduate student enrollments
can be seen very clearly in Figure 8, below.

Figure 8: Relative Enrollment and Relative NIH Funding

In the analyses that follow, we therefore instrument for wages using only the third
and fourth lags of pharmaceutical industry R&D expenditures, relative to GDP. The
relevance of industry R&D expenditures to market wages is tested via the partial F26

statistic for the excluded instruments in the first stage regression. To maximize the
number of usable observations in our time series given restrictions on available data, we
employ the PhRMA estimated R&D expenditures as instruments, and use the BEA
pharmaceutical R&D estimates as the explanatory variable for our demand equations.
Overid Testing
In addition to the relevance condition—that industry R&D expenditures must be
correlated with the endogenous regressor, market wage—industry R&D expenditures
must also satisfy the exogeneity condition. That is, industry R&D expenditures can only
be correlated with graduate student enrollment and completions via the price mechanism
(wages). When the system is overidentified, meaning the number of exogenous
instrumental variables exceeds the number of problematic endogenous variables, we can
use the Sargan or Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions (“overid tests”) to assess
whether evidence supports exogeneity of the instruments.
Overid tests essentially construct alternative models using subsets of the
instruments so that the system is “just-identified,” meaning there are only as many
instruments as there are regressors, and then compare the residuals. If the overid test
statistic exceeds its critical value, this can be interpreted either as evidence that one or
more of the instruments is correlated with the error term (so is not exogenous after all), or
possibly that the omitted instruments actually belong in the second-stage regression and
our equation is misspecified (see Davidson and McKinnon (2004), p. 336-338).
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Using Hansen’s J-statistic, we are testing the null hypothesis that all of the
instrumenting variables are valid. If the critical value associated with this test is large
relative to the chi-squared random variable, and significant at the .05 or .10 significance
level, then we reject the null hypothesis.
III.

RESULTS

In this section we summarize the results of econometric regressions used in this paper.
We have used time-series data to create OLS and IV models which provide some insight
into the responsiveness of graduate students to macroeconomic inputs. The conclusions
resulting from these estimations, combined with descriptive statistics, help to map the
realities of the biomedical workforce.
Models of the Supply of Biomedical Scientists
We begin with basic OLS regression to see if graduate students in biomedical
fields express rational expectations in the labor market. Models (1) and (2) in Table 3 are
dynamic autoregressive models, with the log of the number of students entering PhD
programs as the dependent variable. All equations are in a log-log format, giving us the
elasticity of any given variable.
The dynamic ordinary least squares model (1) has for an outcome variable the log
of entering PhD students. Predictor variables are the six-year leads of wages and
employment. This regression finds no significant effects on enrollment for either of the
labor market variables. Only the coefficient on the lagged AR(1) dependent variable is
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significant, with a coefficient exceeding one, indicating an unstable, or non-stationary,
process.
Lacking useful results from the forward-looking dynamic model, we test cobweb
expectations in model (2). In this regression logged wages and employment are measured
in the present time period t. PhD enrollment is found to be significantly correlated with
employment. A 1% increase in biomedical jobs will yield an approximately .45%
increase in graduate enrollment (p<.001).
For model (3) we add the use of relative variables to our OLS cobweb model in
order to control for any cohort effects. It is possible that population trends may be
increasing PhD enrollments, instead of labor market trends. For this reason we divide the
dependent variable by the number of students graduating from the university with a
degree in biology or chemistry. In addition, we relativize wages by dividing by an
opportunity-cost salary and employment by dividing by employment in non-PhD S&E
careers fields.
Model (3) yields no significant results and is revealed by the Durbin-Watson test
to have high autocorrelation. We attempt to mitigate autocorrelation in model (4) by
returning to a dynamic cobweb model and first-differencing all variables. The
autoregressive variable in this model is the only significant variable, revealing that a 1%
increase in logged relative enrollment in the previous period will increase logged relative
enrollment in the present period by .83%.
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Table 3. Rational versus Cobweb Expectations in PhD Enrollments
(1)

OLS
Dynamic
Forward

(2)

OLS
Dynamic
Cobweb

(3)

(4)

OLS
Relative
Cobweb

OLS
Relative
Dynamic
FirstDifferenced
Cobweb

-0.148

-0.973

-1.942

1.178

(0.903)
0.0674

(0.686)
0.445***

(2.884)
0.603

(0.749)
-0.0883

(0.0661)

(0.129)

(0.200)

(0.308)

Graduate First-Time
Enrollment, t-1

1.197***

0.164

0.829***

(0.156)

(0.258)

(0.202)

Observations

12

12

12

11

Durbin-Watson

2.088

2.118

0.373

2.299

Wages
Employment

Durbin's alternate
0.0405
0.0551
29.59
1.157
Durbin's alternate p-value
0.846
0.821
0.000616
0.318
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Outcome variable for models (1) and (2) is the log of the number of students entering
PhD programs in biomedical sciences. Outcome variable for models (3) and (4) is the log
of the ratio of the number of students entering PhD programs to the number of Bachelor's
degrees earned in biological sciences and chemistry.
Wages and employment variables for model (1) are six-year leads, reflecting expected
market conditions at time of graduation with perfect foresight (rational expectations).
Models (2)-(4) use current wages and employment levels (cobweb expectations). Models
(3) and (4) use the log of the ratio of wages for biomedical sciences vs. alternative career
fields, and the log of the ratio of employment in biomedical sciences occupations vs.
alternative career fields.
In model (4), all variables are first-differenced to mitigate autocorrelation.
All equations are estimated using OLS, and fully robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses below each coefficient estimate.
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Autocorrelation seems to be resolved by first-differencing all of the variables.
However, the explanatory variables of wage and employment remain insignificant. Least
there be simultaneity from the two independent variables, we run a first-differenced
cobweb model, model (1) in table 4, with only log relative wage as the independent
variable. This regression provides us with a unit-elastic result for wage (p<.1).
Using the same variables as model (1), we switch to IV regression for model (2).
This should help address any endogeneity that may have been an issue in the wage
variable. IV regression reveals a wage elasticity of 3, (p<0.1). When we add lagged
variables of wage and employment in model (3), now calculating PhD completions
instead of entrants, we find a similar elasticity on wage which is also significant. This
indicates that labor supply is highly responsive to changes in wage.
Model (4) exchanges the present-day wage calculation for a lagged NIH funding
variable – the effect of logged, relative, first-differenced NIH funding of students in time
period t-6 on present-day logged, relative, first-differenced completions. Employment at
time t-6 is very significant (p<.001), indicating that a 1% change in the first-difference of
employment results in an .87% change in the first-difference of completions. The lagged
wage variable is not significant at all – indicating that students may care more about their
prospect of getting a job than they do about the wage they will earn. The NIH funding
variable is also very significant (p<.001), and it is negative. A 1% increase in the change
in NIH funding at the time of enrollment actually has a 1.4% negative effect on the
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change in completions. This may be because an increased number of students being
funded by the NIH could have a negative effect on the quality of student.
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Table 4. Cobweb vs Rational Expectations on PhD Enrollment and Completions

Relative Wage, t

(1)

(2)

OLS
Cobweb
FirstDifferenced
Enrollments
0.974*
(0.434)

IV Cobweb
FirstDifferenced
Enrollments
3.167*
(1.827)

(3)

(4)

IV Mixed
IV Cobweb
FirstFirstDifferenced Differenced
Completions Completions
3.596**
(1.812)

Relative Employment, t
0.346
(1.421)
0.409
(0.283)

1.006
(0.778)
0.874***
(0.0782)

11

5

-1.492***
(0.351)
5

0.222

0.417

4.193

0.5973

0.4804

Relative Wage, t-6
Relative Employment, t-6
Relative Enrollment, t-1

0.793***
(0.156)

0.601**
(0.261)

Percent of Students with NIH
Funding, t-6
Observations
Durbin-Watson
Durbin's alternate
Durbin's alternate p-value
First-Stage F-stat
Partial R-squared

11
2.163
0.214
0.656

OLS

Hansen's J-statistic
3.030
0.0541
0.316
Hansen's J p-value
0.220
0.816
0.574
Outcome variables for models (1) and (2) are first-differenced logs of the ratios of firsttime graduate student enrollment in biomedical sciences PhD programs, over total
Bachelor's degrees in biological sciences and chemistry that year. Outcome variables for
models (3) and (4) are logs of the ratio of PhDs completed over the sixth lag of
Bachelor's degrees.
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Table 5, model (1) once again raises the issue of simultaneity. The dynamic OLS
regression produces strong significance on each of the four variables included, the
negative coefficient on present-day log relative wage has returned. This implies that an
increase in the relative wage for biomedical scientists of 1% decreases PhD completions
by 2%, (p<.001). Two other variables in the model are more predictable, with
employment and NIH Funding both being highly significant. Students will complete their
PhD more quickly with the possibility of a job and they will complete it in a less timely
manner if they enrolled at a time of NIH funding expansion.
Model (2) returns to IV regression, using the exact same variables from model
(1), but the first-stage partial F-statistic is unimpressive. The instrumented variable in this
model is the lagged relative PhD completions variable – indicating that instruments do a
better job of predicting quantity than price.
IV models (3) and (4) provide very strong results. This is most likely a result of
the reduction in the number of observations, in addition to the time period over which
they span. NIH obligations and industry R&D are the instruments for employment in this
model. The observations in these two models cover the years 2006 through 2010 – a
period which follows the NIH budget expansion years when Congress was no longer
emphasizing biomedical research. Whereas the NIH was a significant driver the labor
market in the past, when budget growth stopped other variables were given the
opportunity to become influential – including industry R&D. The partial F-statistic for
models (3) and (4) are very good compared to previous estimations.
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Both models indicate that scientist supply is very responsive to changes in wages.
Model (3) controls for the availability of NIH student support at matriculation, producing
a significant coefficient nearly identical to that from table 4, model (4). The story remains
that students who enroll in the midst of NIH support growth are less likely to graduate in
a timely manner. Model (4) finds something unique to previous NIH support coefficients
in this paper. Students who are in the middle of their biomedical studies when the NIH
begins an expansion are more likely to graduate. For a 1% increase in the change in the
proportion of NIH students funded in year 3 of their PhD program, there will be a 1.2%
increase in the six-year completion rate (p<.001).
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Table 5. Effects of NIH Funding for Graduate Students on PhD Completion Rates
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

OLS
Forward
Dynamic
-2.063**

IV Forward
Dynamic
1.494

IV Mixed
FirstDifferenced
2.912***

IV Mixed
FirstDifferenced
4.157***

(0.758)

(1.631)

(0.900)

(0.350)

Log Employment, t

0.463***

1.183***

Log Percent of Students
with NIH Funding, t-6

(0.0695)
-2.423***
(0.494)

(0.190)
-3.715***
(0.476)

Log Wage, t

-1.453***
(0.262)
1.235***

Log Percent of Students
with NIH Funding, t-3

(0.0857)

Log Employment, t-6
Log Relative Completions,
t-1

0.721***

0.463***

(0.112)

(0.0381)

0.793***

0.682***

(0.156)

(0.144)

Observations

12

10

5

5

Durbin-Watson

2.065

Durbin's alternate

0.0578

Durbin's alternate p-value

0.817
1.013

3.353

7.855

0.9558

.9821

.9192

Hansen's J-statistic

0.0486

0.0169

1.057

Hansen's J p-value

0.826

0.897

0.304

First-Stage F-stat
Partial R-squared

OLS

Outcome variables for models (1) and (2) are the log of absolute PhD completions from
biomedical PhD programs in a given year. Outcome variables for models (3) and (4) are
the same, with the addition that these variables have been first-differenced. The log of
wages is differenced in equations (3) & (4), as is the Logged Percent of Students with
NIH funding in time period t-6.
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Models of the Demand for Biomedical Scientists
Table (6) model (1) presents results from an inverse (log-log) demand function
where the first-difference of wages is determined by first-differenced values for
employment, NIH R&D, and the lagged value of Industry R&D. We are able to use the
third and fourth lags of pharmaceutical R&D investment as instruments for employment
because the observations span a time period after the NIH budget doubling had come to
an end. The overid test fails to reject the null hypothesis, allowing that the variables may
be exogenous. By this specification we find that wages are negatively affected by
employment rates so that a 1% increase in employment yields a .76% decrease in wages
at time t (p<.001). This corroborates economic theory.
We also calculate a traditional demand function. Model (2) relates the elasticity of
biomedical science labor demand with respect to wages. Every coefficient is highly
significant with an elasticity of -1.2% for the wage variable. This indicates that a 1%
increase in wages results in a 1.2 percent decrease in biomedical labor demand (p<.001).
While both models had ubiquitously significant coefficients and a strong partial
first-stage F-stat, it is worthwhile to note that the coefficients on NIH R&D Obligations
are larger than the coefficients for Industry R&D in both the invers demand function and
the demand function. The NIH variable is significantly more influential in both models,
with a value of (.7, p<.001) in the inverse function and (.9, p<.001) in the regular

37

demand function. Industry R&D only had an elasticity of demand of less than .3 in both
models (p<.001).
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Table 6. Demand Functions for Biomedical Sciences Labor

Employment, t

(1)

(2)

Inverse
Demand

Demand Function

-0.768***
(0.0273)

Wage, t

-1.299***
(0.0402)

NIH R&D Obligations, t

0.695***

0.906***

(0.0578)

(0.0553)

0.226***

0.295***

(0.0180)

(0.0191)

0.0369***

0.0481***

(0.00207)

(0.00110)

Observations

7

7

First-Stage F-stat

80.17

597.2

Partial R-squared

0.9836

0.9845

Hansen's J-stat

1.546

1.471

Hansen's J p-value

0.214

0.225

Instruments

L4D.lrgind
L3D.lrgind

L4D.lrgind
L3D.lrgind

Industry R&D, t-1
Constant

The outcome variable for model (1) is the logged first-difference of wages
within biomedical sciences. The outcome variable in model (2) is the log of
first-differenced biomedical employment. All independent variables in
equations (1) and (2) are first-differenced and logged. NIH R&D Obligations
at time t and Industry R&D at time t-1 are both relative variables – each
divided by GDP.
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IV.

CONCLUSIONS

IV.A. Policy Implications
This research finds that graduate biomedical students take wages and employment
levels into consideration when they are deciding whether or not to pursue a PhD. We find
that the most significant influence on matriculation is the level of National Institutes of
Health funding available. A matriculated student is not, however, a future graduate. NIH
funding ironically lures life science students into graduate school while simultaneously
decreasing their chances of success. It may be that the allure of extra funding
opportunities is too strong – drawing insufficiently prepared students into biomedical
science.
In the first-differenced cobweb OLS model, we found positive unit-elastic wage
significance upon enrollment. A one percent increase in wages would result in a one
percent increase in enrollments. Using IV cobweb, first-differenced models, we found
some significance in relative wages. We find robust evidence that elasticity of labor
supply (as measured by PhD enrollment and completions) with respect to relative wages,
whether at time of entry to the PhD program or at time of completion, has an elasticity of
about 3. This implies that labor supply is highly responsive: a 1% increase in relative
wages would result in a 3% increase in relative employment. It is using IV cobweb firstdifferencing that we first see negative effect of NIH funding on completions. An inverse
demand function reveals a very significant, negative effect of employment on salary. In a
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regular demand function, NIH R&D obligations are revealed to be very significant and
unit elastic.
The findings around NIH R&D funding are the most significant results of this
research. This contributes to previous literature in the field indicating that discretion in
the use of NIH funding for student aid is vital. Figure 8 indicates that students are highly
responsive to the availability of funding when deciding whether to enroll. Figure 7 shows
that the early availability of NIH funds in a student’s graduate career may delay or
altogether prevent graduation. The NIH is right to have begun the research into graduate
careers that began with the NIH Advisory Committee to the Director (ACD) Biomedical
Research Workforce Working Group. Our results would indicate that the NIH can get the
most from their human capital investments by restricting the years of graduate school in
which NIH funding is available. If this funding were to be given to students beginning
only in year 3 of their graduate school career, it might reduce excess enrollment of the
unqualified while increasing completions. The NIH may, however, consider other
strategies. If they wish to increase the overall quality of graduating students, the NIH may
choose to continue funding students early in their careers – luring a greater number of
applicants - under the assumption that only the brightest will complete, increasing the
graduate pool from which scientists are made.
IV.B. Limitations
The most significant results from this paper have come from simple correlations.
Figure 8 shows a very significant relationship between NIH funding and enrollment. The
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econometric regressions run in this paper are hampered by the restricted availability of
data - caused by the career code reclassifications in Bureau of Labor Statistics data which
occurred in 1998. Our results, however, are in line with those produced in similar
research. It is possible that these methods could be applied with an expanded dataset in
the future, yielding similarly significant results around the importance of wages and
employment rates.
Ryoo and Rosen (2004) find a similar wage elasticity, between 2.5 and 4.5, in
their research on engineering graduate students. Freeman (1974), Ryoo & Rosen (2004),
and the research presented in this paper all found a greater relevance in cobweb
expectation models. This would indicate that students may be less forward-looking in
their decision making than they are responsive to present-day conditions.

IV.C. Summary and Directions for Future Research
This paper was unable to conduct an analysis of demographic responses to
macroeconomic matriculation incentives. The data would indicate that race and gender
have some effect on the types of occupations that students will ultimately work in. Future
research should seek to understand the effect of race and gender on responsiveness to
macroeconomic variables. It would also be ideal for these same analyses to be conducted
with alternate wage data. The Survey of Doctoral Recipients could provide an alternate
source of wage data for scientists working in biomedicine. Finally, a larger time series is
needed in order to lend greater significance to these wage and employment results. In 15
42

or 20 years these analyses might be repeated, creating greater insight into the significance
of wages and employment upon matriculation. In the meantime, the National Institutes of
Health and other graduate student funding sources would do well to carefully examine
the mechanisms and timelines by which they will assist potential and current students.
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APPENDIX TABLE A1.
American Community Survey Undergraduate Field-of-Degree Codes for
Biological Sciences and Chemistry
Code
Field of Degree
Biological Sciences Fields
3600
Biology
3601
Biochemical Sciences
3602
Botany
3603
Molecular Biology
3604
Ecology
3605
Genetics
3606
Microbiology
3607
Pharmacology
3608
Physiology
3609
Zoology
3611
Neuroscience
3699
Miscellaneous Biology and Epidemiology
2402
Biological Engineering
2404
Biomedical Engineering
4002
Nutritional Sciences
5102
Applied Biotechnology
Chemistry Fields
5003
Chemistry
2405
Chemical Engineering
Health Related Fields
6100
General Medical and Health Services
6102
Communication Disorders Sciences and Services
6103
Health and Medical Administrative Services
6104
Medical Assisting Services
6105
Medical Technologies Technicians
6106
Health and Medical Preparatory Programs
6107
Nursing
6108
Pharmacy
6109
Treatment Therapy Professions
6110
Community and Public Health
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